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Just Your Run-of-the-Mill  
Sovereign Debt Crisis: An Analysis of  






In 2014, the Supreme Court of the United States decided a 
highly sensitive and controversial dispute between a group of 
international investors and the country of Argentina.  In Republic of 
Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd.,1 the Court considered whether the 
Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976 (FSIA)2 limited the scope 
of discovery available to a judgment creditor in post-judgment 
execution proceedings against a foreign sovereign.3  The majority 
opinion found that while the FSIA grants jurisdictional and execution 
immunity to foreign sovereigns, it contains no “plain statement” on 
post-judgment discovery against a foreign sovereign.4  Through this 
textual silence, the majority held that the FSIA does not preclude 
discovery of Argentina’s extraterritorial assets in post-judgment 
proceedings.5 
 
 †   J.D. Candidate, 2015, University of Maryland Francis King Carey School 
of Law. The author thanks her family and friends for their support, Professor 
Michael Van Alstine for his guidance, and the Maryland Journal of International 
Law for their invaluable editorial work. 
 1.  (Discovery Case), 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014). 
 2.  28 U.S.C. §§ 1330, 1330, 1332, 1391(f), 1441(d), 1602−1611 (1976). 
 3.  Discovery Case, 134 S.Ct. at 2253. 
 4.  Id. at 225657. 
 5.  Id. 
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Although the majority rendered a judgment that supposedly 
aligned with a strict textual interpretation of the FSIA, the opinion 
focused squarely on the absence of an affirmative command in the 
FSIA, while disregarding the broader purpose of the statute.  
Importantly, the Court ignored the relevancy requirement of 
discovery found in the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure (FRCP), 
thereby permitting transnational fishing expeditions.
6
  The majority 
opinion also casts aside considerations of international comity and 
reciprocity in international relations.7  The majority also fails to 
acknowledge the distinct position of a sovereign state as a debtor.  
Consequently, U.S. courts will be embroiled in complex transnational 
discovery disputes and will be required to equitably balance interests 
between the United States, other sovereign nations, and nonparties—
a task the Supreme Court has made much more difficult. 
Part I of this Note describes the historical background to the 
Argentine default and the procedural background of the NML Capital 
case.  Part II discusses the legal background of NML Capital by first 
examining the history of sovereign immunity in the United States and 
the enactment of the FSIA.  Part II then analyzes U.S. discovery as it 
is conducted domestically and the tensions it encounters abroad.  Part 
III addresses the Supreme Court’s reasoning in the NML Capital case 
and its conclusion that the FSIA does not preclude discovery of 
Argentina’s extraterritorial assets.  Part IV argues that the majority in 
NML Capital erred because it selectively interpreted the FSIA and 
failed to recognize that requested discovery must be relevant, as 
dictated by the FRCP.  Furthermore, Part IV argues that the 
majority’s disregard of international comity and reciprocity will hurt 
the United States and its interests abroad, and that the Court’s 
treatment of the Argentine default as a “run-of-the-mill” debt crisis is 
a reductive error that will have far-reaching implications. 
II. THE CASE 
Petitioner, the Republic of Argentina, and respondent, NML 
Capital, Ltd., have been embroiled in litigation battles regarding the 
lack of bond repayment for over a decade.8  While the courts have 
 
      6.    FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1). 
 7.  See David E. Teitelbaum, Strict Enforcement of Extraterritorial Discovery, 
38 STAN. L. REV. 841, 854 (1986) (noting that “[c]omity is a type of reciprocal 
recognition of domestic laws between friendly countries”). 
 8.  EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina., 695 F.3d 201, 203 (2d Cir. 2012) 
(discussing the Republic of Argentina’s default on payment of external debt 
beginning in December 2001).  
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been quick to note that Argentina has made many contributions to the 
law of foreign insolvency,9 the most recent default that set in motion 
the litigation at issue began in December 2001, when Argentina 
announced a moratorium10 on its debt service payments.11  This is 
possibly the largest and most complex default in global history.12 
 A. Background to the Argentine Default 
Though Argentina’s economy was robust at the beginning of the 
1900s, a century-long economic decline,13 and a sharp downturn in 
the 1980s,14 led to the implementation of a convertibility system by 
1991.15  This policy, which guaranteed a fixed exchange rate for 
Argentine pesos to U.S. dollars, managed to stave off inflation and 
encourage investors to seek out Argentina as a lucrative and stable 
option for foreign investment.16  Indeed, Wall Street actively 
marketed Argentina to its investors.17  Through the mid-to-late 1990s, 
 
 9.  EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 473 F.3d 463, 466 n.2 (2d Cir. 2007) 
(noting that Argentina’s history of default and restructuring of sovereign debts has 
produced a “rich literature” beginning with its London Stock Exchange bond 
default in 1827). 
 10.  See Alice de Jonge, What are the Principles on International Law 
Applicable to the Resolution of Sovereign Debt Crises?, 32 POLISH Y.B. INT’L L. 
129, 141 (2012) (discussing how debt moratoria can take the form of a complete or 
partial cessation of payment for a permanent or limited period of time, and usually 
are viewed as unilateral attempts by debtor states to bring about debt restructuring). 
 11.  EM Ltd., 473 F.3d at 466. 
 12.  Arturo C. Porzecanski, From Rogue Creditors to Rogue Debtors: 
Implications of Argentina’s Default, 6 CHI. J. INT’L L. 311, 317 (2005). 
 13.  See JIM SAXTON, U.S. CONG. JOINT ECON. COMM., ARGENTINA’S 
ECONOMIC CRISIS: CAUSES AND CURES, 2, 6 (2003) (referencing the “economic 
boom” in Argentina in the late 1800s; noting that, in 1913, Argentina’s GDP per 
person was seventy-two percent of the U.S. level (higher than France, Germany, or 
Sweden’s), but that by 1990, this economic measure was just twenty-nine percent 
of the U.S. level—far below all Western European countries). 
 14.  Id. at 1 (discussing the peso convertibility and exchange systems in which 
many Latin and South American countries were engaging, as well as the 
subsequent currency devaluations and economic crises).  
 15.  Convertibilidad del Austral [Austral Convertibility], Law No. 23.928, Mar. 
27, 1991, B.O 27104 (Arg.); Moneda de Curso Legal – Cambio de Denominación y 
Valor de Billetes y Moneda [Legal Currency – Change of Designation and Value of 
Banknotes and Currency], Decree No. 2128/91, Oct. 10, 1991, B.O. 27243 (Arg.).  
See also Saxton, supra note 13, at 4.  
 16.  SAXTON, supra note 13, at 4. See also Paul Blustein, Argentina Didn’t Fall 
on Its Own, WASH. POST (Aug. 3, 2003), http://www.washingtonpost.com/wp-
dyn/articles/A15438-2003Aug2.html. 
 17.  Blustein, supra note 16 (describing the Goldman Sachs report, “A Bravo 
New World” sent to clients in 1996, praising the country’s commitment to the peso 
convertibility system which was seen to be particularly lucrative to investors, also 
noting the habit of rating the performance of mutual and pension funds higher for 
investing in emerging markets with large debt; Argentina was often No. 1 during 
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Argentina’s economy expanded, with firms such as Goldman Sachs, 
Morgan Stanley, and Credit Suisse First Boston building a presence 
in Argentina, and facilitating the sale of bonds.18  It is estimated that 
securities firms made nearly $1 billion in fees underwriting Argentina 
government bonds from 1991 to 2001.19 
In addition to Argentina’s commitment to the convertibility 
exchange system, the country’s swift and extensive deregulation 
efforts made the country attractive to foreign investors.20  Bypassing 
many of the normal and generally slower legislative channels, 
President Carlos Menem enacted a number of deregulation reforms 
by emergency decree.21  While this deregulation attracted investors 
and helped modernize Argentina’s utilities, there was a growing 
shadow of unemployment threatening economic stability.22  
Furthermore, there was increasing complacency among Argentine 
government officials regarding spending in light of the “easy” 
investment money coming in from foreign sources.23 
Impacted by currency crises in other countries that increased 
interest rates and wreaked havoc on its economy, Argentina 
experienced economic recessions in 1995 and 1998.24  Increased 
political instability further harmed the Argentine economy.25  As 
 
the 1990s).  
 18.  Id.  See also SAXTON, supra note 13, at 7 (finding that Argentina attracted 
extensive foreign investment). 
 19.  Blustein, supra note 16. 
 20.  See id. (discussing the 1996 Goldman Sachs investment report that praised 
President Carlos Menem’s deregulation reforms).  See also, NAOMI KLEIN, THE 
SHOCK DOCTRINE: THE RISE OF DISASTER CAPITALISM 30708 (2007) (discussing 
the Goldman Sachs investment report entitled “A Bravo New World,” where 
Argentina and other countries where praised for their massive privatization efforts). 
 21.  See SAXTON, supra note 13, at 7 (noting that a possible reason for this 
route was that Menem was facing opposition to reforms, even within his own 
Peronist Party, due to a lack of transparency and the monopolistic character of 
many of the reforms). 
 22.  Id. 
 23.  See Blustein, supra note 16 (quoting former Secretary of Economic Policy 
for Argentina, Rogelio Frigerio, “[i]f you get the money so easily as we did, it’s 
very tough to tell the politicians, ‘Don’t spend more, be more prudent,’ because the 
money was there, and they knew it”). 
 24.  Id.  See also SAXTON, supra note 13, at 8 (suggesting that the currency 
crises in Russia and particularly Brazil, Argentina’s largest trading partner, 
contributed to the 1998 recession). 
 25.  See SAXTON, supra note 13, at 89 (noting that Fernando de la Rúa, who 
succeeded President Menem in 1999, facing “widely differing ideas about 
economic policy,” the resignation of de la Rúa’s Vice President, Carlos Alvarez, in 
2000, and three resignations of three different economy ministers within three 
weeks in 2001, further destabilized the Argentine government). 
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Argentina became a less attractive investment opportunity, capital 
began to leave the country.  This led the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF) to grant stand-by loans to Argentina in 2000 and 2001 that 
totaled nearly $22 billion.26 
The reality of massive bond payments coming due in 2001, 
however, threatened to push the Argentine economy to the brink.27  In 
March 2001, Argentina entered into high interest refinancing deals, 
or “debt swaps” of its bonds, which Wall Street banks suggested and 
managed.28  Despite forecasts for Argentina’s default, the seven firms 
managing the refinancing deal pushed it through, making an 
estimated $100 million in fees.29  The debt swap was only a short-
term solution, delaying the inevitable repayment, but now at higher 
interest rates.30 
Despite another installment of the IMF stand-by loans, by 
November 2001, money was flying out of the country and Argentina 
imposed extraordinary measures on withdrawals, essentially freezing 
bank accounts.31  After rioting and another change in political regime, 
Argentina defaulted on its debts at the end of 2001.32 Argentina’s 
President declared a “temporary moratorium” on payments of a large 
portion of its debt, including the bonds under the debt swaps.33 
In January 2005, Argentina presented a unilateral restructuring 
offer to bondholders, which 76% of the parties accepted.34  In 2010, 
another restructuring offer was presented to bondholders and nearly 
all of them accepted the voluntary terms, except a small minority 
 
 26.  See SAXTON, supra note 13, at 12 (noting that like other IMF loans, it 
disbursed in installments, but unlike other IMF loans, it was the largest approved 
for any country in history). 
 27.  Blustein, supra note 16. 
 28.  See id. (noting that David Mulford, chairman international of Credit Suisse 
First Boston, met with Argentine economy minister Domingo Cavallo to propose a 
“debt swap” where Argentina’s bondholders could voluntarily exchange old bonds 
for new bonds, delaying the impending payments to a later time in an effort to give 
Argentina “breaking space” to begin an economic recovery). 
 29.  Id. 
 30.  See also SAXTON, supra note 13, at 12 (noting that while debt swaps 
reduced debt repayments in the short term, they resulted in higher repayments 
later).  
 31.  Blustein, supra note 16. 
 32.  Id.  
 33.  NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina (Equal Treatment Case I), 699 
F.3d 246, 251 (2d Cir. 2012) (noting that as of 2012, Argentina has passed 
legislation renewing the moratorium and has made no principal or interest 
payments on its debts). 
 34.  Porzecanski, supra note 12, at 317. 
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including NML Capital.35  In February 2012, the U.S. District Court 
for the Southern District of New York signed an order,36 affirmed by 
the Second Circuit Court of Appeals in October 2012,37 enjoining 
Argentina from paying the restructured bondholders before the 
holdout bondholders.38  Negotiations between the holdouts and 
Argentina were largely futile,39 resulting in another default for 
Argentina—this time affecting the payments to restructured 
bondholders.40 
  B. Background to the Case 
NML Capital, a hedge fund, and other investors began to buy 
Argentina’s distressed debt41 through secondary markets as early as 
1998 and as recently as June 2010.42  While the discount on distressed 
debt can vary between 20% and 80%,43 NML Capital’s purchase of 
distressed Argentine debt has been described as “cents on the 
dollar.”44  It is precisely this discount that makes distressed debt 
 
 35.  See H.C., Argentina and the Holdouts: A Fight Without a Hero, THE 
ECONOMIST (Aug. 15, 2014, 12:51 PM) http://www.economist.com/blogs/americas 
view/2014/08/argentina-and-holdouts (noting that 93% of Argentina’s bondholders 
opted to restructure). 
 36.  Order, NML Capital, Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, No. 08-cv-6978 (TPG) 
(S.D.N.Y. Feb. 23, 2012) (granting injunctions to specifically enforce the pari 
passu clause in Argentina’s debt documentation). 
 37.  Equal Treatment Case I, 699 F.3d at 246. 
 38.  See generally, Romain Zamour, NML v. Argentina and the Ratable 
Payment Interpretation of the Pari Passu Clause, 38 YALE J. INTL. L. ONLINE 55 
(2013) (discussing the impact of the “ratable payment” interpretation on sovereign 
debt restructuring and how it may be limited to the facts). 
 39.  H.C., Argentina and the Holdouts Tick Tock, THE ECONOMIST (Jul. 17, 
2014, 10:17 AM) [hereinafter Tick Tock], http://www.economist.com/blogs/americ 
asview/2014/07/argentina-and-holdouts. 
 40.  Id.  
 41.  See Michelle M. Harner, Trends in Distressed Debt Investing: An 
Empirical Study of Investors’ Objectives, 16 AM. BANKR. INST. L. REV. 69, 75 
(2008) (describing distressed debt investing as purchasing the “debt of a financially 
troubled company at a discount against the face value of the debt”).  See also 
Christopher C. Wheeler & Amir Attaran, Declawing the Vulture Funds: 
Rehabilitation of a Comity Defense in Sovereign Debt Litigation, 39 STAN. J. INT’L 
253, 254 (2003) (noting that funds “specializing in distressed assets—also known 
as ‘vulture funds’—are a new species of holdout creditor that has emerged . . . 
[becoming] a creditor by way of the secondary market, purchasing sovereign debt 
at a discount . . . [refusing] to participate in any voluntary restricting, [and] 
attempt[ing] to use litigation to collect from the sovereign debtor the full face value 
of its claim”; also noting that the term “vulture fund” is a pejorative”). 
 42.  Equal Treatment Case I, 699 F.3d at 251. 
 43.  See Harner, supra note 41, at 75.  
  44. Eighth Time Unlucky, THE ECONOMIST (Aug. 2, 2014)  
http://www.economis t.com/news/leaders/21610263-cristina-fern-ndez-argues-her-
countrys-latest-default-different-she-missing (noting the description of hedge funds 
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attractive to investors.  Despite the risks, distressed debt investors 
will attempt to make a profit through restructuring deals, selling the 
debt, or, similar to NML Capital’s strategy, by resorting to the courts 
to recover the full value of the debt.45 
NML Capital has filed eleven actions against Argentina in the 
U.S District Court for the Southern District of New York.46 The 
hedge fund has won five money judgments in its favor totaling (with 
interest) nearly $1.6 billion.47  In the remaining six actions, NML 
Capital was granted summary judgments with claims totaling (with 
interest) more than $900 million.48  Argentina, however, has refused 
to satisfy these judgments, calling NML Capital “extortionists” and 
decrying the U.S. court rulings as unjust.49  Argentina cites orders 
enjoining the country from paying the restructured debt holders50 and 
a “Rights on Future Offers” (RUFO)51 clause in the restructured bond 
deals as reasons for not paying NML Capital. 
In an effort to enforce the judgments, NML Capital has made 
many attempts to gain discovery concerning Argentina’s assets in the 
United States and around the world.52  One of the more notable 
attempts was a 2012 Ghanaian Superior Court judgment,53 resulting 
 
as “vulture funds” by Argentina and those opposed to this practice). 
 45.  See Harner, supra note 41, at 75. 
 46.  EM Ltd., v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 203 (2d Cir. 2012); see 
also J.F. HORNBECK, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., R41029, ARGENTINA’S DEFAULTED 
SOVEREIGN DEBT: DEALING WITH THE “HOLDOUTS” 9 (2013) (noting that in the 
United States, approximately 151 individual cases have been filed against 
Argentina in the U.S. District Court for the Southern District of New York, with 
108 judgments entered at $5.9 billion in principal and interest). 
 47.  EM Ltd., 695 F.3d at 203.  
 48.  Id. 
 49.  Sarah Marsh, Argentine Default Looms as Time Runs Out for Debt Deal, 
REUTERS (Jul. 26, 2014, 8:51 AM) http://www.reuters.com/article/2014/07/26/us-
argentina-debt-idUSKBN0FV0DH20140726. 
 50.  See supra Part I.A 
 51.  See Tick Tock, supra note 39 (explaining that the RUFO clause written into 
the restructured bond deals prevents Argentina from offering a better deal to other 
entities than it is offering under the restructured deals, meaning if Argentina meets 
NML Capital’s demands for payment in full, it must then pay the restructured debt 
holders in full; noting that there is some disagreement over the exact impact of the 
RUFO clause). 
 52.  EM Ltd., 695 F.3d at 203. 
 53.  ARA Libertad (Arg. v. Ghana), Case No. 20, Order of Dec. 15, 2012, 
available at  
https://www.itlos.org/fileadmin/itlos/documents/cases/case_no.20/C20_Order_15.1
2.2012.corr.pdf; see also Régis Bismuth, The Path Towards an International 
Public Policy for Sovereign Debt Contracts, 9 BRAZILIAN Y.B. INT’L L. 122, 123 
(2014) available at http://www.regisbismuth.com/ (explaining that the litigation 
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in the detention of an Argentine Navy vessel, with its crew still 
aboard.54  Other high-profile incidents include attempts to seize the 
Argentine presidential plane, Tango 01,55 a run-in at the Frankfurt 
Book Fair,56 and Argentina’s withholding of certain pieces of artwork 
from German exhibits, out of concern that they would be seized.57 
In 2010, NML Capital served subpoenas on Bank of America 
and Banco de la Nación Argentina, two non-party financial 
institutions.58  This was done in an attempt to gain discovery 
regarding how Argentina moved assets through New York and 
around the world, so as to “accurately identify the places and times 
when those assets might be subject to attachment and execution” 
whether in the U.S. or in foreign jurisdictions.59 
Both subpoenas defined “Argentina” broadly to include the 
country’s “agencies, ministries, instrumentalities, political 
subdivisions [and] employees,” with the Bank of America subpoena 
including Argentina’s president, Cristina Fernández de Kirchner.60  
Furthermore, the Bank of America subpoena sought documents 
without a territorial limit.61 
In post-judgment proceedings, Argentina and both non-party 
banks moved to quash the subpoena, while NML Capital moved to 
 
reached the International Tribunal of the Law of the Sea, which finally ordered the 
release of the vessel). 
 54.  Agustino Fontevecchia, The Real Story of How a Hedge Fund Detained a 
Vessel in Ghana and Even Went for Argentina’s ‘Air Force One’, FORBES (Oct. 5, 
2012, 6:50 PM) http://www.forbes.com/sites/afontevecchia/2012/10/05/the-real-
story-behind-the-argentine-vessel-in-ghana-and-how-hedge-funds-tried-to-seize-
the-presidential-plane/. 
 55.  Id.  
 56.  Id. (noting that Argentina registered at the Frankfurt Book Fair as an 
individual person, rather than as a sovereign, perhaps in a bid to avoid exposure, 
and specifically held back pieces of artwork for fear of seizures). 
 57.  Id. 
 58.  EM Ltd., 695 F. 3d at 20304. 
 59.  Id. 
 60.  EM Ltd., v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 204 (2d Cir. 2012); Joint 
Appendix at 39, 77, 92, Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., 134 S. Ct. 
2250 (2014) (No. 12-842), 2014 WL 769626, at *47, *57, *84. 
 61.  EM Ltd., 695 F.3d at 204. See Joint Appendix at 39, Republic of Argentina 
v. NML Capital, Ltd. (Discovery Case), 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014) (no. 12-842), 2014 
WL 769626, at *50 (requiring specified document production for all “databases and 
transactional systems to which [Bank of America has] possession, custody, or 
control that would contain the records sought for [Argentina],” not specifying 
territorial limitations as Bank of America is a multinational financial institution 
with locations globally). 
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compel.62  Ultimately, the district court compelled discovery, but 
expected the parties to “limit the subpoenas to discovery that was 
reasonably calculated to lead to attachable property.”63  Argentina 
appealed the order to the Second Circuit, arguing that compelling 
discovery against its foreign assets abroad violates the FSIA.64  The 
Second Circuit affirmed the discovery order, noting that the 
subpoenas did not attach Argentine property and were not directed to 
Argentina itself—but rather at third party banks—and did not 
infringe Argentina’s sovereign immunity.65  Argentina appealed the 
Second Circuit’s decision to the Supreme Court.66 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
 A.  Background of Sovereign Immunity in the United States and 
the Enactment of the Federal Sovereign Immunities Act 
 1. Sovereign Immunity and the Shift Toward a Restrictive 
Theory of Immunity 
Sovereign immunity law derives from the maxim that the “King 
can do no wrong.”67 Initially, the United States adhered to a doctrine 
of “absolute immunity,” meaning sovereign states were always 
immune from prosecution in U.S. courts.68  This was first considered 
in The Schooner Exchange v. McFaddon,69 where the Supreme Court 
held that a military ship of a foreign sovereign that maintains a 
 
 62.  EM Ltd., 695 F.3d at 204 (noting that before the District Court rules, NML 
Capital agreed to some limitations to the breadth of the subpoenas and certain 
confidentiality measures). 
 63.  Id. at 20405. 
 64.  Id. at 205. 
 65.  Id. 
     66. Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. 2250 (2014). 
 67.  Herbert Barry, The King Can Do No Wrong, 11 VA. L. REV. 349, 353 
(1925) (discussing the tradition of English monarchy but noting that before Edward 
I [12391307] there was the “fable” of a king sued in court like an ordinary person, 
and noting that Saxon kings were elected to the throne, rather than assuming it 
through a “divine right” principle).  
 68.  Berizzi Bros. Co. v. The Pesaro, 271 U.S. 562, 574 (1926) (holding that 
ships owned by foreign powers are immune from U.S. court jurisdiction, regardless 
of the nature of the ship’s conduct, essentially endorsing the theory of absolute 
sovereign immunity).  See also Stephen J. Leacock, The Joy of Access to the Zone 
of Inhibition: Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., and the Commercial Activity 
Exception Under the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act of 1976, 5 MINN. J. 
GLOBAL TRADE 81, 85 (1996) (discussing the U.S. endorsement of the classical, or 
absolute, theory of sovereign immunity). 
 69.  11 U.S. (7 Cranch) 116 (1812). 
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peaceful relationship with the United States, “must be considered as 
having come into the American territory, under an implied promise, 
that while necessarily within it, and demeaning herself in a friendly 
manner, she should be exempt from the jurisdiction of the country.”70  
The premise underlying the absolute immunity doctrine was that 
sovereigns were equals and one could not exercise dominion over the 
other.71 
In 1952, the U.S. State Department joined a growing 
international trend and embraced a “restrictive theory” of sovereign 
immunity.72  This meant, “immunity of the sovereign is recognized 
with regard to sovereign or public acts (jure imperii) of state, but not 
with respect to private acts (jure gestoinis).”73  Essentially, the 
restrictive theory narrowed sovereign immunity to only the public 
acts conducted by the sovereign on behalf of the state.74  While courts 
were not bound by the State Department’s shift in policy, the influx 
of amici briefs filed by the Executive branch in cases involving 
foreign sovereigns frequently persuaded the courts to follow the 
restrictive theory.75 
 2.  The Doctrine After the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 
While the U.S. State Department adopted a restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity, it failed to outline any clear standard for 
implementation, and political pressure often led to inconsistent State 
Department intervention in cases.76  By enacting the FSIA, Congress 
 
 70.  Id. at 147. 
 71.  Texas Trading & Mill. Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 647 F.2d 300, 
302 n.1 (2d Cir. 1981) overruled by Frontera Resources Azerbaijan Corp. v. State 
Oil Co. of Azerbaijan Republic, 582 F.3d 393 (2d Cir. 2009) (noting the ancient 
maxim of sovereign immunity – par in parem imperium non habet). 
 72.  Letter from Jack B. Tate, Acting Legal Advisor, Department of State to 
Acting Attorney General Philip B. Perlman (May 19, 1952), in 26 DEP’T ST. BULL., 
Jun. 1952, at 984 [hereinafter “Tate Letter”] (noting the trend of restricting 
sovereign immunity in Western Europe, as well as other areas of the world).  See 
also The International Convention for the Unification of Certain Rules relating to 
the Immunity of State-owned Vessels, signed at Brussels, April 10 1926, English 
text, available at 6 BENEDICT, Admiralty 23942 (7th ed. Knauth, 1958).  The 
treaty was signed by ten countries that originally supported the absolute theory of 
sovereign immunity.  
 73.  Tate Letter, supra note 72, at 984. 
 74.  Id. 
 75.  See Leacock, supra note 68, at 8687 (noting that the State Department 
amicus briefs often persuaded the courts). 
 76.  See Verlingen B.V. v. Cent. Bank of Nigeria, 461 U.S. 480, 487 (1983) 
(discussing how application of the newer, restrictive sovereign immunity theory 
“proved troublesome” as “foreign nations often placed diplomatic pressure on the 
State Department in seeking immunity”). 
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codified the restrictive theory of sovereign immunity in U.S. law and 
thereby reduced the role of the State Department in corresponding 
litigation.77  As the House Report noted: 
[A] principal purpose of this bill is to transfer the 
determination of sovereign immunity from the 
executive branch to the judicial branch, thereby 
reducing the foreign policy implications of immunity 
determinations and assuring litigants that these often 
crucial decisions are made on purely legal grounds and 
under procedures that insure due process.78 
The FSIA is now the only means of establishing jurisdiction 
over a foreign state in a U.S. court.79  A U.S. court can assert 
jurisdiction over a sovereign when a foreign state’s actions fall within 
one of the enumerated exceptions, including commercial activities.80  
However, how Congress intended to define the terms “foreign state” 
and “commercial activities” has been a frequent source of confusion. 
Under the FSIA, a foreign state is defined to include the 
“political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state.”81  In determining agency and/or 
instrumentality, courts have historically relied on the “majority 
ownership” analysis,82 but the Supreme Court narrowed this approach 
 
 77.  Leacock, supra note 68, at 8788.  
 78.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, at 7 (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 
6604, 660608; see also Republic of Austria v. Altmann, 124 S. Ct 2240, 225253 
(2004) (holding that the FSIA applies retroactively to conduct that occurred before 
its enactment). 
 79.  See also Argentine Republic v. Amerada Hess Shipping Corp., 488 U.S. 
428, 443 (1989) (noting that the FSIA “provides the sole basis for obtaining 
jurisdiction over a foreign state” in the U.S. courts). 
 80.  28 U.S.C § 1605(a)(2) (2008).  “A foreign state shall not be immune from 
the jurisdiction of courts of the United States or of the States in any case . . . in 
which the action is based upon a commercial activity carried on in the United 
States by the foreign state; or upon an act performed in the United States in 
connection with a commercial activity of the foreign state elsewhere; or upon an act 
outside the territory of the United States in connection with a commercial activity 
of the foreign state elsewhere and that act causes a direct effect in the United 
States . . . .”  
 81.  28 U.S.C. § 1603(b) (2005).  The section states, “[a]n ‘agency or 
instrumentality of a foreign state’ means any entity, which is a separate legal 
person, corporate or otherwise, and which is an organ of a foreign state or political 
subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or other ownership interest is 
owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof. . . .” 
 82.  See Matthew Engellenner, The Disadvantaged Plaintiff: Is it Time to 
Revisit the Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act?, 17 SUFFOLK J. TRIAL & APP. 
ADVOC. 375, 383 (2012) (discussing the “majority ownership test” in regard to 
evaluating a foreign state’s ownership interest in an entity). 
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in Dole Food Co. v. Patrickson83 by holding that the majority 
ownership must be “direct” to meet the FSIA definition of agency or 
instrumentality.84 
Additionally, questions of what constitutes the “commercial 
activities” exception have plagued the courts.85 When the U.S. 
Supreme Court addressed the issue in Republic of Argentina v. 
Weltover,86 it adopted the Second Circuit’s “private person test,”87 
declaring that if a sovereign performs an act that could readily be 
performed by a private citizen, then those actions are “commercial” 
within the meaning of the FSIA and the sovereign cannot invoke 
immunity.88 Again, this is reflective of the restrictive theory of 
sovereign immunity that was meant to be codified within the FSIA. 
All of the exceptions and nuances of the definitions aside, there 
is a presumption of immunity for foreign states in U.S. courts under 
the FSIA.89  The Supreme Court has held that the FSIA confers two 
types of immunity upon foreign states: jurisdictional immunity under 
section 1604 and execution immunity under sections 1609 and 
1610.90 
 
 83.  538 U.S. 468 (2003). 
 84.  Id. at 474.  The court defined “direct” in terms of corporate law, citing the 
majority ownership of shares, as opposed to ownership through corporate tiers.  Id. 
at 47475.  The court reasoned that the FSIA refers explicitly to the “ownership of 
‘shares,’ showing that Congress intended statutory coverage to turn on formal 
corporate ownership.”  Id. at 474. 
 85.  Compare Texas Trading & Milling Corp. v. Federal Republic of Nigeria, 
647 F.2d 300, 309  (2d Cir. 1981), cert. denied, (454 U.S. 1148 (1982)) (reasoning 
that an activity is commercial “if the activity is one in which a private person could 
engage), with Practical Concepts, Inc. v. Republic of Bolivia, 811 F.2d 1543, 1548 
(D.C. Cir. 1987) (reasoning that analysis of the “basic exchange” and not on the 
“facilitating features” is determinative as to whether an activity is commercial 
under the FSIA), and with De Sanchez v. Banco Central de Nicaragua, 770 F.2d 
1385, 1393 (5th Cir. 1985) (basing its decision upon “the different purposes 
motivating the sales,” reasoning that “the essence of an act is defined by its 
purpose”). 
 86.  504 U.S. 607 (1992).  
 87.  See Texas Trading & Milling Corp., 647 F.2d at 300. 
 88.  Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 614 (1992). 
 89.  28 U.S.C. § 1605 (2008).  See Southway v. Central Bank of Nigeria., 328 
F.3d 1267, 1271 (2003) (noting that a foreign state is presumptively immune under 
the FSIA and remains so unless one of the specific statutory exceptions applies). 
 90.  Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2252.  
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 B. United States Discovery – at Home and Abroad 
 1. The United States Adversary System and its Impact on 
Domestic Discovery 
As a common law country, the United States employs an 
adversarial legal system, meaning that many of the pre-trial and trial 
decisions, like discovery, are left to the parties and their counsel.91  
This contrasts with civil law countries, which typically employ 
inquisitorial pre-trial and trial procedures that leave the process 
principally in the hands of a judge.92  Within an adversarial system, 
the opposing parties will generally need to conduct discovery so that 
a trial will be “less a game of blind man’s bluff and more a fair 
contest with the basic issues and facts disclosed to the fullest possible 
extent.”93  U.S. discovery has been described as “wide-open” when 
compared globally,94 likely due in large part to the country’s rigorous 
adversarial system.95 
However, the relevancy requirement in Rule 26(b)(1) is a 
significant limit on the scope of discovery, mandating that “[u]nless 
otherwise limited by court order . . . [p]arties may obtain discovery 
regarding any nonprivileged matter that is relevant to any party’s 
claim or defense . . . [and r]elevant information need not be 
admissible at the trial if the discovery appears reasonably calculated 
to lead to the discovery of admissible evidence.”96 
In addition to the FRCP, the inherent supervisory powers of the 
 
 91.  See Michael Asimow, Popular Culture and The Adversary System, 40 LOY. 
L.A. L. REV. 653, 653 (2007) (noting that the central precept of the adversarial 
system is the clash of proofs presented by opposing lawyers so a neutral and 
passive decision maker can evaluate the information presented and resolve the 
dispute). 
 92.  Id. at 653. 
 93.  United States v. Proctor & Gamble Co., 356 U.S. 677, 682 (1958) (finding 
that in the case at issue, the desired disclosure of grand jury materials to the 
defendant in a civil case did not outweigh the public policy interest in grand jury 
secrecy). 
 94.  See Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2254 (noting that the general rule in the 
federal system as stated in FRCP 26(b)(1) is that, subject to the district court’s 
discretion, “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged matter that 
is relevant to any party’s claim or defense”).  See also David Brewer, Obtaining 
Discovery Abroad: The Utility of the Comity Analysis in Determining Whether to 
Order Production of Documents Protected by Foreign Blocking Statutes, 22 HOUS. 
J. INT’L L. 525, 536 (2000) (describing the U.S. approach to discovery like the 
freedom of speech, premised on a “wide-open” approach to find the truth). 
 95.  See Asimow, supra note 91, at 653 n.1 (noting that the U.S. employs a 
more extreme version of the adversarial system than any other country).  
 96.  FED. R. CIV. P 26(b)(1). 
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courts are another important source of discovery law in the United 
States.97  The Restatement (Third) of Foreign Relations Law of the 
United States also provides authoritative, albeit non-binding, 
guidance in regard to U.S. discovery abroad.98 
In Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, the specific type of 
discovery at issue was that utilized in post-judgment execution 
proceedings, which are governed by FRCP 69(a)(2).99  That rule 
permits a judgment creditor to obtain discovery from “any person—
which includes a judgment debtor—as provided in [the FRCPs] or by 
the procedure of the state where the court is located.”100  Both federal 
and New York state rules governing post-judgment execution 
discovery are generally permissive.101  As with other forms of 
discovery, a judgment creditor who is seeking discovery in aid of 
execution “must proceed in good faith, and must not use disclosure 
devices for harassment, especially when dealing with a nonparty.”102 
Nonparties are not immune from discovery orders.  FRCP 37(c) 
provides that nonparties “may be compelled to produce documents 
and tangible things or to permit an inspection.”103  Because a 
subpoena duces tecum is available under FRCP 45 to gain document 
disclosure without the need for depositions, it is typically used on 
nonparties,104 and is intended to be “as broad against a nonparty as 
against a party.”105 
 
 97.  See, e.g., FED. R. CIV. P 26(c) (providing for court-imposed sanctions 
against parties who use discovery devices excessively without justification or who 
fail to comply with discovery requests).  See also Amy Coney Barrett, The 
Supervisory Power of the Supreme Court, 106 COLUM. L. REV. 324, 33435 (2006) 
(noting that “because a federal court could not exercise its core Article III power of 
adjudication without an accurate and relevant factual record, it must have the power 
to do those things necessary to develop an accurate and relevant factual record–
including such things as managing discovery, compelling testimony, appointing 
experts, and excluding and admitting evidence.”). 
 98.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES (REVISED) § 442 (1987). See infra Part II.B.3. 
 99.  Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2254. 
 100.  FED. R. CIV. P. 69(a)(2). 
 101.  Id.  See N.Y. CIV. PRAC. LAW ANN. § 5223 (West 1997) (entitles judgment 
creditors to discover “all matter relevant to the satisfaction of [a] judgment.”).  See 
also Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2254 (commenting on the permissive nature of 
the FRCP and New York Law regarding discovery). 
 102.  30 AM. JUR. 2D Executions and Enforcement of Judgments § 623 (2005). 
 103.  FED. R. CIV. P. 34(c). 
 104.  FED. R. CIV. P. 45.  
 105.  Id.  See also FED. R. CIV. P. 30(b)(6) (allowing a nonresident to be 
designated by the institutional deponent, thereby overcoming the “100 mile” 
geographic limitation of FRCP 45); Jay C. Carlisle, Nonparty Document Discovery 
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Federal courts have differed regarding what an opposing party 
must show when seeking post-judgment discovery in aid of 
execution.  The Ninth Circuit has stated that if a party seeking 
discovery can illustrate “significant questions regarding 
noncompliance,” then appropriate discovery should be granted.106  
The Sixth Circuit has stated that, in seeking post-judgment discovery 
arising from a fraud on the court claim, “it [is] at least necessary” for 
the defendant requesting the discovery to present some proof to 
establish its charges of fraud.107 
Of particular interest to this paper, the Third Circuit considered 
the impact of NML Capital in Ohntrup v. Makin Ve Kimya Endustrisi 
Kurumu,108 finding that if a subject property is immune under the 
FSIA from attachment, “then the District Court should deny . . . [the] 
discovery request ‘because information that could not possibly lead 
to executable assets is simply ‘not relevant’ to execution in the first 
place.’”109  However, the court noted that if the district court found 
the subject property was not immune, then that factor would weigh in 
favor of the party seeking discovery, and if the district court chooses 
not to decide the subject property’s immunity or lacks “sufficient 
information” to decide, then “any speculation in that regard should 
not be a factor in the [c]ourt’s unreasonable burden analysis” in 
deciding to grant discovery.110 
 2. The Tensions of United States Discovery in Foreign 
Jurisdictions 
District courts are empowered to grant a motion to compel 
discovery in foreign jurisdictions.  Under U.S. law, courts have been 
able to impose jurisdiction in foreign nations through the doctrine of 
extraterritoriality.111 Courts consider several factors when determining 
 
from Corporations and Governmental Entities Under the Federal Rules of Civil 
Procedure, 32 N.Y.L. SCH. L. REV. 9, 37 (1987). 
 106.  California Dept. of Social Services v. Leavitt, 523 F.3d 1025, 1034 (2008) 
(finding that a Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(f) analysis that summary judgment should not be 
granted while an opposing party timely seeks discovery of potentially favorable 
information also applies to the analysis of permitting discovery in the context of a 
motion to enforce a judgment). 
 107.  H.K. Porter Co. v. Goodyear Tire & Rubber Co., 536 F.2d 1115, 1122 (6th 
Cir. 1976). 
 108.  760 F.3d 290 (3d Cir. 2014). 
 109.  Id. at 29697 (quoting Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2257). 
 110.  Id. at 297 (analyzing Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 225758). 
 111.  See Note, Predictability and Comity: Toward Common Principles of 
Extraterritorial Jurisdiction, 98 HARV. L. REV. 1310, 1310 (1985) [hereinafter 
Predictability and Comity] (discussing the need to develop a set of principles to 
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if the exercise of extraterritorial jurisdiction over a person or activity 
is unreasonable.112 While there is a general presumption against 
extraterritoriality, the rise of the global economy and increased legal 
transactions in areas such as trademark, antitrust, and taxation have 
helped spur the extraterritorial application of U.S. law.113  This 
extended reach has strained foreign relations over what is often 
perceived as an aggressive and inconsistent imposition of U.S. 
jurisdiction and has led many foreign states to enact retaliatory 
legislation.114 
One type of retaliatory legislation used by foreign states are 
blocking statutes.  These laws are designed to block U.S. discovery in 
foreign jurisdictions by imposing criminal penalties upon parties who 
disclose evidence.115  However, even if a party faces criminal 
penalties in a foreign jurisdiction for compliance with a U.S. court 
order, that alone may not be sufficient to deny discovery.116 
The seminal case analyzing motions to compel discovery in the 
face of foreign blocking statutes and the consideration of sanctions 
for the failure to comply is Societe Internationale Pour 
Participations Industrialles et Commerciales, S.A. v. Rogers.117  In 
Societe Internationale, the Supreme Court addressed whether a case 
could be dismissed based on the petitioner’s failure to comply with a 
 
evaluate alternatives to the general doctrine of extraterritorial jurisdiction). 
 112.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES (REVISED) § 403(2) (1987).  These factors include the activity’s connection 
to the territory (e.g. substantial or direct contact), the state seeking jurisdiction’s 
connection to the person of which jurisdiction is desired (e.g. nationality), the 
character of the activity to be regulated, the existence of justified expectations that 
might be protected or hurt, the importance of the regulation to the international 
political, legal, or economic system, the regulation’s consistency with traditions of 
the international system, the interest of the regulating state, and the likelihood of 
conflicts with another state’s regulations. 
 113.   Mark Gibney, Response, Toward a Theory of Extraterritoriality, MINN. L. 
REV. HEADNOTES, Spring 2011, at 81, 82 nn.4–6, 
http://www.minnesotalawreview.org/headnotes/theory-extraterritoriality/. 
 114.  See Predictability and Comity, supra note 111, at 131011 n.6 (1985) 
(noting that retaliatory legislation falls into three main categories: secrecy statutes, 
blocking statutes, and “clawback” statutes). 
 115.  See Brewer, supra note 94, at 526, 536 (noting that comity is complicated 
by the “great antipathy some foreign jurisdictions have for American style 
discovery”). 
 116.  See FED. R. CIV. P. 37 (allowing a court to impose sanctions upon a party 
for its failure to comply with a court discovery order).  While FRCP 37 does not 
explicitly list default judgments as a possible sanction, they have been “sustained as 
a valid exercise of the District Court’s power under FRCP 37(d).”  In re Uranium 
Antitrust Litigation, 617 F.2d 1248, 1258 (7th Cir. 1980).  
 117.  357 U.S. 197 (1958). 
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U.S. court order for document production concerning a Swiss Bank 
account, when doing so would potentially violate Swiss law.118  The 
Court held that the district court was justified in issuing a production 
order, despite the petitioner’s risk of criminal penalties in 
Switzerland.119 
In deciding to uphold the production order, the Court analyzed 
three factors.120  The Court first reasoned that a decision to broadly 
deny discovery in all cases where a party feared criminal penalties 
from a foreign jurisdiction would run counter to Congress’ intent in 
enacting the statute at issue.121  Furthermore, the Court noted that the 
particular records at issue might have a “vital influence” in the 
litigation.122  Finally, the Court pointed out that the petitioner is in a 
position to negotiate a waiver of the criminal penalty with the foreign 
nation, or “at least achieve a significant measure of compliance with 
the production order.”123  While these three factors helped frame the 
decision, the Court strictly limited the analysis to the instant case, 
thereby also limiting its precedential value.124 
 3. A Shifting Landscape – From a Pure Comity Approach to 
Balancing Tests 
In choosing to limit the holding in Societe Internationale, the 
Supreme Court failed to provide a clear framework for analysis in the 
lower courts, leading to inconsistent evaluations of non-compliance 
with U.S. discovery in foreign jurisdictions.125  Initially, courts 
 
 118.  Id. Specifically, Article 273 of the Swiss Penal Code, prohibiting economic 
espionage, and Article 47 of the Swiss Bank Law, concerning secrecy of banking 
records. Id. at 200.   
 119.  Id. at 205–06. 
 120.  Id. at 204 (noting that although Swiss penal laws “did limit [the] 
petitioner’s ability to satisfy the production order,” that they did not do so to the 
level where the documents effectively “disappeared” or were taken into custody by 
a third party).  See also Brewer, supra note 94, at 537 (discussing the Court’s use of 
three factors, which have become the backbone for analyzing the suitability of 
production orders for foreign evidence). 
 121.  Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 20506 (noting that in broadening the 
Trading with the Enemy Act in 1941, Congress intended to reach “enemy interests 
which masqueraded under . . . innocent fronts,” therefore, if discovery was denied 
in all cases where a party faced criminal penalties in a foreign jurisdiction, parties 
would be incentivized to seek out those jurisdictions to avoid discovery).  Brewer, 
supra note 94, at 537. 
 122.  Societe Internationale, 357 U.S. at 205. 
 123.  Id.  
 124.  Brewer, supra note 94, at 538. 
 125.  GARY B. BORN, INTERNATIONAL CIVIL LITIGATION IN UNITED STATES 
COURTS 873 (3d ed. 1996); Teitelbaum, supra note 7, at 844. 
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emphasized foreign relations in deciding whether to compel U.S. 
discovery abroad when faced with a foreign blocking statute.  The 
Second Circuit, noting that foreign law prohibitions on disclosure act 
as a bar to ordering production of documents,126 developed what came 
to be known as the “pure comity” approach.127 
Critics of the pure comity evaluation pointed out that the 
approach favored foreign law over U.S. substantive law, thereby 
encouraging the enactment of foreign blocking statutes and the 
creation of “information havens” to frustrate U.S. court orders.128  
They also argued that the pure comity approach would deny basic 
justice to parties seeking discovery.129 
Eventually, the lower courts shifted from a pure comity 
approach to a number of balancing tests that varied between partial 
deference to foreign blocking statutes laws and total disregard for 
international relations.130  These balancing tests analyzed factors 
largely based on Societe Internationale, the five-factor analysis in 
Restatement (Second) of the Foreign Relations of United States,131 or 
 
 126.  See In re Chase Manhattan Bank, 297 F.2d 611, 613 (2d Cir. 1962) (noting 
that while the U.S. government has a real interest in obtaining evidence wherever it 
is located, the government also has an obligation to respect laws of other sovereign 
states); Ings v. Ferguson, 282 F.2d 149, 152 (2d Cir. 1960) (reasoning that under 
“fundamental principles of international comity, [the] courts dedicated to the 
enforcement of . . . laws should not take such action as may cause a violation of the 
laws of a friendly neighbor or, at the least, an unnecessary circumvention of its 
procedures.”); First Nat’l City Bank v. IRS, 271 F.2d 616, 619 (2d Cir. 1959) 
(noting that if production of documents in Panama would violate Panamanian laws, 
then discovery should not be ordered). 
 127.  See Daniela Levarda, Note, A Comparative Study of U.S. and British 
Approaches to Discovery Conflicts: Achieving a Uniform System of Extraterritorial 
Discovery, 18 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1340, 136466 (1995) (noting that this 
approach centered on “maintaining amicable relations with non-U.S. trading 
partners” by deferring to foreign blocking statutes when determining whether to 
compel U.S. discovery abroad). 
 128.  Teitelbaum, supra note 7, at 865.  Teitelbaum defines an “information 
haven” as “a jurisdiction whose laws are intentionally structured to attract 
commerce based on a promise of secrecy.”  Id. at 848 n. 32.  
 129.  Id. at 856. 
 130.  Brewer, supra note 94, at 544. 
 131.  RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED 
STATES § 40 (1965) (listing the five-factor analysis: (a) vital national interests of 
each of the states; (b) the extent and the nature of the hardship that inconsistent 
enforcement actions would impose upon the person; (c) the extent to which the 
required conduct is to take place in the territory of the other state; (d) the 
nationality of the person; and (e) the extent to which enforcement by action of 
either state can reasonably be expected to achieve compliance with the rule 
prescribed by that state).  
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a combination thereof.132  Without a definitive standard, however, the 
factors were applied piecemeal—with some courts adding factors or 
emphasizing some over others in their analyses.133 Not surprisingly, 
the lack of consensus among the lower courts led to inconsistent 
holdings.134 
Partially to blame for the piecemeal application of the various 
factors was that the Restatement (Second) was drafted for general 
issues of international conflict, not specifically tailored for non-
compliance issues regarding U.S. discovery abroad.135  In an attempt 
to reconcile this, the tentative drafts and final texts of the Restatement 
(Third) of the Foreign Relations Law of the United States created 
provisions to include non-compliance with discovery in a foreign 
jurisdiction.136  While the Supreme Court in Societe Nationale 
 
 132.  Teitelbaum, supra note 7, at 856. 
 133.  See United States v. Vetco, Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1288 (9th Cir. 1981) 
(adopting a balancing test that strictly adhered to the five-factors from Section 40 
of the Restatement Second); Minpeco v. S.A. Conticommodity Services, Inc., 116 
F.R.D. 517, 522–23 (S.D.N.Y. July 9, 1987) (modifying the Restatement Second 
factors and creating a new four-part balancing test); In re Uranium Antitrust 
Litigation, 480 F. Supp. 1138, 1148 (N.D. Ill. 1979) (emphasizing the importance 
of U.S. statutory policies, the importance of the requested documents to key 
elements of the claims, and the degree of flexibility in the foreign nation’s 
application of its nondisclosure laws).  See also Teitelbaum, supra note 7, at 
85758 (noting that a piecemeal application of the Restatement factors was due in 
part to the general conflicts provision of section 40). 
 134.  See Brewer, supra note 94, at 544 (discussing the lack of consensus among 
the courts in regard to the various balancing tests).  Compare United States v. 
Vetco Inc., 691 F.2d 1281, 1287 (9th Cir. 1981) (affirming civil contempt orders 
for a failure to comply with production orders, and noting that Societe “held only 
that the district court could not dismiss a plaintiff’s complaint for failure to comply 
with a discovery request where the plaintiff had made extensive good faith efforts 
to comply”) with In re Westinghouse Elec. Corp Uranium Contracts Litigation, 563 
F.2d 992, 99799 (10th Cir. 1977) (holding that a lack of good faith on the part of 
the non-compliant party is not determinative in compelling a production order, and 
noting that the defense did not “stand or fall” on the discovery order). 
 135.  Graco, Inc. v. Kremlin, Inc., 101 F.R.D. 503, 512 (N.D. Ill. April, 13, 
1984) (noting that § 40 of the Restatement “addresses international conflicts in 
general, and is not tailored precisely to conflicts between discovery procedures and 
blocking statutes”). 
 136.  Id. at § 442(1)(c) (listing the revised five-factor analysis:”[i]n deciding 
whether to issue an order directing production of information located abroad, and in 
framing such an order, a court or agency in the United States should take into 
account [a] the importance to the investigation or litigation of the documents or 
other information requested [b] the degree of specificity of the request; [c] whether 
the information originated in the United States; [d] the availability of alternative 
means of securing the information; and [e] the extent to which noncompliance with 
the request would undermine important interests of the United States, or 
compliance with the request would undermine important interests of the state where 
the information is located”). 
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Industrielle Aérospatiale v. United States Dist. Court,137 suggested 
that the Restatement (Third) factors are “perfectly appropriate for 
courts to use” when there is no treaty to govern discovery requests, 
the Court did not require their use.138  This has again led to divergent 
interpretations among the lower courts.139 
 4. International Law Conflicts with U.S. Discovery Practice 
While international law has attempted to provide a legal 
framework for transnational discovery, the results have not been 
harmonious.  International treaties, bilateral treaties, and mutual 
assistance agreements140 have been drafted and signed in an effort to 
create a more consistent and predictable transnational discovery 
process, but to varying results. 
The United States is a signatory to the Hague Convention on the 
Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial Matters (Hague 
Evidence Convention),141 a multilateral treaty designed to create a 
measure of predictability and stability in transnational discovery 
proceedings.142  A primary concern during the drafting of the treaty 
was that the taking of evidence on foreign soil could be inconsistent 
with the laws of the country where the litigation takes place, creating 
 
 137.  482 U.S. 522 (1987). 
 138.  Id. at 556.  See also infra Part II.B.4 (discussing Aérospatiale’s departure 
from first resort to the Hague Evidence Convention for a comity analysis). 
 139.  See, e.g., Milliken & Co. v. Bank of China, 758 F. Supp. 2d 238, 246 
(S.D.N.Y. Dec. 6, 2010) (acknowledging that the U.S. Supreme Court has 
identified these factors as relevant in the analysis, but then stating two additional 
factors to consider: whether “any hardship to the responding party would suffer if it 
complied with the discovery demands and whether the responding party has 
proceeded in good faith”). 
 140.  Mutual Legal Assistance Treaties (MLAT) are instruments that assist in 
taking evidence in a country for criminal matters and will not be further discussed 
in this Note.  See Mark K. Gyandoh, Foreign Evidence Gathering: What Obstacles 
Stand in the Way of Justice?, TEMP. INT’L & COMP. L.J., Spring 2001 at 81, 89 
(2001) (discussing the appearance of MLATs in the mid-twentieth century in order 
to compel countries to assist each other, including in criminal evidentiary matters). 
 141.  Convention on the Taking of Evidence Abroad in Civil or Commercial 
Matters, opened for signature Mar. 18, 1970, 23 U.S.T. 2555 [hereinafter Hague 
Evidence Convention] (consisting of a multilateral treaty, of which the United 
States became a signatory in 1972). See also George A. L. Droz, A Comment on the 
Role of the Hague Conference on Private International Law, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. 
PROBS. 3, 34 (1994) (discussing the first Hague Convention on Civil Procedure, 
which was revised in 1905 and ratified in 1954, but by 1965 was broken into three 
“modern” conventions for Service, Evidence, and a final convention combining 
legal aid, deposits for costs, safe conduct of witnesses, and detention of foreign 
debtors). 
 142.  Brewer, supra note 94, at 531. 
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conflict and leading to ineffective results for litigants.143  Therefore, 
the Hague Evidence Convention provides that local judicial or 
government officials be included in most evidence gathering 
functions allowed under the treaty’s terms.144  While this seems to be 
workable in theory, the Hague Evidence Convention has become a 
source of litigation within the United States regarding its 
interpretation and impact upon U.S courts’ ability to compel 
transnational discovery.145 
The language in the Hague Evidence Convention itself creates a 
number of tensions that run counter to the consistent and harmonious 
framework it was intended to create.  First, the treaty incorporates a 
number of provisions allowing signatories to opt out of certain 
procedures.146  Furthermore, the treaty does not address judicial 
supervision and the amount of supervision required to appropriately 
execute an extraterritorial discovery request, thereby doing nothing to 
reconcile the difference in discovery proceedings between civil and 
common law jurisdictions.147  Moreover, the Hague Evidence 
Convention does not advance a specific relevancy standard, again 
creating a rift among countries and fragmentation in application of 
the treaty.148 
Apart from standards absent from the treaty, U.S courts diverged 
on how to interpret the Hague Evidence Convention, especially 
before the determinative case, Aérospatiale.149 At least one district 
 
 143.  Id. 
 144.  Id.  See also Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 142, at arts. I, II, 
VIII, and IX. 
 145.  See Gary B. Born, The Hague Evidence Convention Revisited: Reflections 
on its Role in U.S. Civil Procedure, 57 LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 77, 79 (1994) 
(explaining that the Hague Evidence Convention has been frequently litigated in 
the United States, primarily regarding its “exclusivity” or when (if at all) the 
treaty’s discovery procedures must be used in place of U.S. discovery 
mechanisms). 
 146.  See Hague Evidence Convention, supra note 142, at arts. IX, XII, XXIII, 
XXXIII.  Article IX mandates that a state executing a letter of request shall apply 
its own laws regarding procedure; article XII permits a signatory to refuse letters of 
request under certain conditions; article XXIII permits signatories to opt out of 
certain pre-trial discovery obligations; article XXXIII permits signatories to opt out 
of obligations regarding the taking of evidence by diplomatic officers, consular 
agents, and commissioners. 
 147.  Levarda, supra note 127, at 1349. 
 148.  Id. (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26) (noting that while some signatories have left 
relevancy determinations to judges based on the substantive issues in particular 
cases, the United States has found relevancy to be satisfied “as long as it is 
reasonably calculated to result in the procurement of admissible evidence”). 
 149.  Société Nationale Industrielle Aérospatiale v. U.S. Dist. Court 
(Aérospatiale), 482 U.S. 522 (1987). 
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court disagreed with a plaintiff’s argument that the Hague Evidence 
Convention was “intended merely to supplement the less restrictive 
means provided by the [FRCP],” suggesting it may be the exclusive 
means of obtaining discovery within a foreign signatory nation.150  
The Court of Appeals of Texas held in another case that the Hague 
Evidence Convention procedures must be complied with as an 
“avenue of first resort.”151  The Fifth Circuit, in contrast, held that the 
Hague Evidence Convention contains no express provisions for 
exclusivity and that it does not supplant the FRCP discovery 
provisions when production of evidence involves individuals subject 
to in personam jurisdiction of a U.S. court.152 
In Aérospatiale, the Supreme Court held that the Hague 
Evidence Convention was not the exclusive means of obtaining 
discovery within a foreign jurisdiction.153  The Court noted that, while 
“judicial supervision of discovery should always seek to minimize its 
costs and inconvenience,” it is sometimes necessary to seek 
transnational discovery.154 Therefore, “the district court must 
supervise pretrial proceedings” to prevent abuse of discovery 
devices.155  In deciding this, however, the Court did not sweep 
consideration of international relations aside, stating: 
[W]e have long recognized the demands of comity in 
suits involving foreign states, either as parties or as 
sovereigns with a coordinate interest in the litigation.  
American courts should therefore take care to 
demonstrate due respect for any special problem 
confronted by the foreign litigant on account of its 
nationality or the location of its operations, and for 
 
 150.  Philadelphia Gear Corp. v. American Pfauter Corp., 100 F.R.D. 58, 60 
(E.D. Penn. 1983) (noting that permitting “one sovereign to foist its legal 
procedures upon another whose internal rules are dissimilar would run afoul of the 
interests of sound international relations and comity”).  See also Brewer, supra note 
94, at 533. 
 151.  Sandsend Financial Consultants, Ltd. v. Wood, 743 S.W.2d 364, 365 (Tex. 
App. 1988) (quoting Th. Goldschmidt A.G. v. Smith, 676 S.W.2d 443 (Tex. App. 
1984)) (declining to hold that the Hague Evidence Convention’s procedures are 
mandatory). 
 152.  In re Anschuetz & Co., GmbH, 754 F.2d 602, 615 (5th Cir. 1985) (finding 
that a German corporation, subject to court jurisdiction under Louisiana long-arm 
statute, was subject to federal discovery rules). 
 153.  Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 544. 
 154.  Id. at 546. 
 155.  Id.  
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any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state.156 
Significantly, but unhelpfully, the Court declined to articulate 
specific standards or factors to guide this most “delicate task” of 
balancing U.S. and foreign interests.157  This left transnational 
discovery not only still in disarray, but also with new U.S precedent 
that chipped away at any harmonizing efforts the Hague Evidence 
Convention was able to accomplish. 
However, the Hague Conference yielded another treaty relating 
to transnational discovery: the Convention on the Service Abroad of 
Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents in Civil or Commercial Matters 
(Hague Service Convention),158 which attempted to streamline the 
process for service of transnational parties through a number of 
mechanisms, including requiring signatories to create central 
authorities for the delivery of service.159 
As with the Hague Evidence Convention, the Hague Service 
Convention also created confusion, particularly in the United States 
regarding whether the Convention permitted service upon a foreign 
corporation through its wholly-owned and closely-controlled U.S. 
subsidiary as an involuntary agent.160  The Supreme Court in 
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk,161 held that the Hague 
Service Convention does not apply when process is served on a 
foreign corporation by serving its domestic subsidiary which, under 
state law, is the foreign corporation’s involuntary agent for service.162  
The Schlunk decision thereby not only depleted the Convention’s 
effectiveness, but also created further uncertainty in the process of 
 
 156.  Id. at 546. 
 157.  Id. 
 158.  Convention on the Service Abroad of Judicial and Extrajudicial Documents 
in Civil or Commercial Matters, Nov. 15, 1965, 20 U.S.T. 361 [hereinafter Hague 
Service Convention] (consisting of a multilateral treaty – to which the United States 
is a signatory, which entered into force Feb. 10, 1969 – that attempted to provide a 
simpler way to serve process abroad, while assuring fair notice and proof of 
service). 
 159.  See Elizabeth L. Cocanougher, The Hague Service Convention as Enabler: 
Volkswagenwerk Aktiengesellschaft v. Schlunk, 20 U. MIAMI INTER-AM. L. REV. 
175, 176 (1988) (discussing the central authority for delivery of service under the 
Hague Service Convention). 
 160.  Id. 
 161.  486 U.S. 694 (1988). 
 162.  Schlunk, 468 U.S. at 70004 (noting that while the Convention does not 
provide an express standard for “service abroad,” the drafting committee history 
and Articles 15 and 16 of the Convention indicate that a “notification au parquet” 
(service upon a foreign defendant by the deposit of documents with a designated 
local official) were to be eliminated from the Convention). 
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transnational discovery.163 
IV. THE COURT’S REASONING IN ARGENTINA VS. NML CAPITAL 
In a 71 decision written by Justice Scalia164 the Court held that 
the FSIA did not preclude discovery of Argentina’s extraterritorial 
assets.165  The Court noted that the general rule for federal discovery 
is that “[p]arties may obtain discovery regarding any nonprivileged 
matter that is relevant to any party’s claim or defense,” 
notwithstanding the discretion of the district court.166  The Court 
noted that Argentina had not raised this as an issue, so the Court 
simply assumed that “in a run-of-the mill execution proceeding . . . 
the district court would have been within its discretion to order the 
discovery from third-party banks about the judgment debtor’s assets 
located outside the United States.”167  The Court therefore found that 
it faced only a narrow question: whether the FSIA provides for 
immunity to discovery where the debtor is a sovereign.168 
The Court’s review of the post-judgment discovery motion 
centered upon a strict textual interpretation of the FSIA.169  The 
majority found that under the FSIA, foreign states are provided two 
kinds of immunity, “jurisdictional immunity,” and “execution 
immunity.”170  The Court reasoned that jurisdictional immunity was 
waived by Argentina and not at issue.171  As far as execution 
immunity was concerned, the Court noted that it generally shields 
“‘property in the United States of a foreign state’ from attachment, 
arrest, and execution.”172  Focusing on the text of the statute itself, the 
majority stated that there was no “plain statement” in the FSIA 
providing a third type of immunity forbidding or limiting discovery 
in aid of execution of a foreign-sovereign judgment debtor’s assets.173 
Argentina’s defense, according to the Court, was based on the 
silence of the FSIA regarding discovery of a foreign-sovereign 
 
 163.  Cocanougher, supra note 160, at 195. 
 164.  Justice Sotomayor did not take part in either Argentina decision. 
 165.  Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2252. 
 166.  Id. at 2254 (citing FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1)). 
 167.  Id. at 2255 (citing EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 208 
(2d Cir. 2012)). 
 168.  Id. 
 169.  Id. at 2256. 
 170.  Id.  
 171.  Id.  
 172.  Id. (citing 28 U.S.C. § 1609). 
 173.  Id. 
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judgment debtor’s assets.  Argentina argued that before the enactment 
of the FSIA, the United States routinely accorded absolute execution 
immunity to foreign-state property.174  Furthermore, Argentina argued 
that by codifying executive immunity with only a small set of 
exceptions, Congress merely “partially lowered the previously 
unconditional barrier to post-judgment relief.”175  The Court 
ultimately found this unpersuasive, stating that it was not its role to 
solve the riddle of what Congress may have meant, but to interpret 
“what Congress enacted in the FSIA.”176 
It is noteworthy that the majority decision did not consider 
whether a judgment creditor had to show that assets were recoverable 
in the jurisdiction before the court would permit discovery.177  This, 
however, was the chief argument of Justice Ginsburg’s dissent.178  As 
Justice Ginsburg noted, “no inquiry into a foreign sovereign’s 
property in the United States that is not ‘used for a commercial 
activity’ could be ordered; such an inquiry, as the Court recognizes, 
would not be ‘relevant’ to execution in the first place.”179  The dissent 
further questioned what authority permitted a district court in the 
United States to become a “clearinghouse for information” about 
“any and all property held by Argentina abroad?”180  Finally, the 
dissent concluded that a limited discovery of Argentina’s “property 
used [in the United States] or abroad ‘in connection with . . . 
commercial activities,’” would be consistent with the FSIA and U.S 
discovery law.181 
V. ANALYSIS 
 A. The Majority Analyzed Immunity Grants Under the FSIA in a 
Vacuum—Not Accounting for the Reality of Modern Financial 
Transactions 
The majority opinion stated that there are two types of 
immunity: jurisdictional immunity and immunity from execution.182  
 
 174.  Id. at 2257. 
 175.  Id.  
 176.  Id. at 2258 (citing Republic of Argentina v. Weltover, Inc., 504 U.S. 607, 
618 (1992)). 
 177.  Id. at 2259 (Ginsburg, J. dissenting) (emphasis added). 
 178.  Id. 
 179.  Id.  
 180.  Id. 
 181.  Id. 
 182.  Id. at 2256 (majority opinion).  
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It also noted that Argentina was in a unique situation as it had waived 
its jurisdictional immunity when it engaged in the bond deals with 
foreign investors.183  The “uniqueness” of this position, however, is 
debatable. Wall Street and most major global financial institutions are 
based in New York and select New York law as the “choice of law” 
for many agreements precisely for its pro-business laws and 
regulations.184  Firms have massive bargaining power and incentive to 
induce nations to sign deals that waive the FSIA jurisdictional 
immunity and/or consent to New York law before opening the flow 
of capital.  In light of the favorable decisions the holdouts have been 
able to gain in the Southern District of New York and the Second 
Circuit, sovereign jurisdictional waiver and New York choice of law 
can hardly be considered unique. 
The second type of immunity under the FSIA is immunity from 
execution.  The majority narrowly interpreted this type of immunity 
to exclude discovery-in-aid of execution and to apply only to 
sovereign property within the United States.185 This interpretation, 
however, inappropriately emphasizes geographical boundaries and 
fails to consider the vital component of relevancy in discovery. While 
the majority correctly noted that U.S. courts “generally lack 
authority . . . to execute against property in other countries,”186 the 
suggestion that the FSIA permits discovery against non-attachable 
extraterritorial sovereign property is out of step with the FSIA and 
the FRCP. 
The majority opinion thus carved out a greater exception to 
immunity than Congress intended.  Legislative history and prior U.S. 
court decisions suggest that Congress only wanted to “partially lower 
the barrier of immunity from execution,” not drastically reduce or 
alter it.187 The FSIA codified the restrictive theory of immunity, a 
 
 183.  Id. 
 184.  See Theodore Eisenberg & Geoffrey P. Miller, The Flight to New York: An 
Empirical Study of Choice of Law and Choice of Forum Clauses in Publicly-Held 
Companies’ Contracts, 30 CARDOZO L. REV. 1475, 1486 (2009). 
 185.  Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2252; 28 U.S.C. § 1609 (2009). 
 186.  Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2257. 
 187.  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, (1976), as reprinted in 1976 U.S.C.C.A.N. 6604, 
6604, 1976 WL 14078. See also Conn. Bank of Commerce v. Congo, 309 F.3d 240, 
252 (5th Cir. 2002) (noting that in  H.R. REP. NO. 94-1487, Congress only partially 
lowered the barrier of immunity from execution, in order to make it conform more 
closely with  jurisdictional immunity; noting that immunity from execution is more 
narrow); De Letelier v. Republic of Chile, 748 F.2d 790, 799 (2d Cir. 1984) (noting 
that Congress passed the FSIA based on the “views of sovereignty expressed in the 
1945 charter of the United Nations and the 1972 enactment of the European 
Convention, which left the availability of execution totally up to the debtor state,” 
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narrow restriction on the traditional absolute immunity accorded 
sovereign states.188  If Congress wanted to create a greater restriction 
on immunity, it would have done so. 
B. The Majority’s Decision Overlooked the Relevancy 
Requirement of U.S. Discovery 
U.S. courts have interpreted the FSIA to mean that Congress 
“create[d] rights without remedies, aware that plaintiffs would often 
have to rely on foreign states to voluntarily comply with U.S. court 
judgments.”189 The FSIA does not create an affirmative right for 
judgment creditors to gain discovery about property without first 
showing that there is a reasonable chance of execution against the 
extraterritorial property. 
The relevancy requirement in U.S. discovery rules is designed to 
discourage “fishing expeditions.” Nonetheless, fishing for 
information is precisely what NML Capital wishes to do and what the 
majority opinion now permits.  As the dissent correctly noted, “NML 
does not yet know what property Argentina has [outside the United 
States], let alone whether it is executable under the relevant 
jurisdiction’s law.”190  But by permitting NML Capital to seek 
information about Argentina’s “worldwide assets generally,” the 
majority stated that the hedge fund will then be able to “turn up” 
information about Argentina’s assets.191  That information may or 
may not yield assets subject to execution, the majority conceded, but 
it noted that “Argentina’s self-serving legal assertion” – if a party 
cannot execute a judgment against property, it should not pursue 
discovery of information about that property – will not automatically 
“prevail.”192  Ultimately, the majority found that the U.S. District 
Court for the Southern District of New York will “have to settle the 
matter,” as a clearinghouse for information regarding Argentina’s 
worldwide assets.193 
Yet Argentina’s “self-serving legal assertion” is not so deviant 
as the majority would portray.  Essentially, Argentina argues that 
discovery must be relevant in order to be valid. This is completely in 
 
and only lifted the immunity from execution “in part”). 
 188.  See supra Part II.A. 
 189.  Peterson v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 627 F.3d 1117, 1128 (9th Cir. 2010). 
 190.  Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2259 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 191.  Id. at 2258 (majority opinion). 
 192.  Id. at 225758. 
 193.  Id. 
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line with U.S. discovery rules under the FRCP.194  In fact, the 
majority conceded that “information that could not possibly lead to 
executable assets is simply not ‘relevant’” and would render 
subpoenas seeking that type of information unenforceable.195  But 
because NML Capital’s subpoenas do not expressly state that they are 
seeking information that “could not lead to executable assets in the 
United States or abroad,” the majority found them permissible—
again emphasizing that NML Capital does not yet know where 
Argentina’s property is located and should be given leave to search 
the world to turn up information about Argentine assets.196 
Incredibly, the majority found that since neither party expressly 
raised the issues of relevancy and the recoverability of extraterritorial 
assets, it did not need to decide the issue.197  Notwithstanding the fact 
that relevancy is central to discovery,198 the majority then by its own 
logic, should have deferred to the Second Circuit, which recognized 
in regard to extraterritorial assets that post-judgment discovery “must 
be calculated to assist in collecting on a judgment.”199  The Second 
Circuit further noted that the lower court was “well within [it’s] 
discretion to limit discovery where the plaintiff had not demonstrated 
any likelihood that the discovery it sought related to attachable 
assets.”200  Though the discovery requests do not violate the FSIA, 
they run counter to the long-standing requirements that for discovery 
requests to be valid, they must be relevant. 
C. The Majority Unduly Minimized the Significance of Foreign  
Blocking Statutes and the Treatment of State-Owned Entities 
In addition to narrowly interpreting immunity grants under the 
FSIA, the majority in NML Capital ignored the possibility that those 
compelled to produce discovery may face criminal penalties for their 
non-compliance.  Both sides of the pendulum are unworkable.  Never 
allowing discovery when a party faces criminal penalties would be a 
doctrine susceptible to abuse and would undermine the authority of 
U.S. courts.  Conversely, compelling discovery regardless of criminal 
penalties puts those subject to discovery requests in a “catch-22” of 
 
 194.  See supra Part II.A. 
 195. Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 225758. 
 196.  Id. (emphasis added). 
 197.  See id. at 2254 (stating that the Court “need not take up those issues 
today”). 
 198.  FED. R. CIV. P 26(b)(1). 
 199.  EM Ltd. v. Republic of Argentina, 695 F.3d 201, 209 (2d Cir. 2012) (citing 
FED. R. CIV. P. 26(b)(1), 69(a)(2)). 
 200.  Id. 
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either facing criminal penalties in a foreign jurisdiction or contempt 
of court sanctions in the United States.  Lower courts require a clear 
and consistent analysis that can equitably determine when to compel 
production of discovery in these instances. 
The Supreme Court, however, has clearly and consistently 
denied lower courts such guidance.  In Societe Internationale,201 the 
Court failed to create a decision with precedential value by limiting 
the analysis to the particular facts of the case.202  In Aérospatiale,203 
the Court undermined any harmonizing effects of the Hague 
Evidence Convention,204 and also failed to provide standards for 
lower courts to use in balancing competing interests between the 
United States and foreign nations.205  NML Capital compounds this 
problem, adding nothing but confusion and tension to U.S. 
jurisprudence. 
Moreover, NML Capital throws into question the separate 
treatment of foreign state-owned entities and the state itself.  While 
separate corporate entities are founded on the doctrine of limited 
liability,206 lower courts are increasingly interpreting the actions of 
central banks as those of a “private player,” opening assets to 
attachment and execution and weakening the protections under the 
FSIA.207  This judicial trend, combined with NML Capital, means that 
central banks or other state-owned entities could potentially be 
deprived of sovereign immunity in transnational discovery post-
judgment proceedings.  As such, a plaintiff could access sensitive 
information and data concerning a sovereign nation via litigation with 
the central bank. 
 
 201.  Societe Internationale Pour Participations Industrielles et Commerciales, 
S.A. v. Rogers, 357 U.S. 197 (1958). 
 202.  See supra Part II.B.2.  See also Thomas Scott Murley, Compelling 
Production of Documents in Violation of Foreign Law: An Examination and 
Reevaluation of the American Position, 50 FORDHAM L. REV. 877, 891 (1982) 
(noting that the lack of precedential value may be responsible for the divergent 
analyses used by lower courts regarding discovery and foreign blocking statutes). 
 203.  Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. 522. 
 204.  See supra Part II.B.4. 
 205.  See supra Part II.B.2. (While suggesting that the Restatement (Third) 
factors were the right factors to balance, the Supreme Court failed to create a 
binding precedent from its decision.). 
 206.  See Phillip Riblett, A Legal Regime for State-Owned Companies in the 
Modern Era, 18 J. TRANSNAT’L L. & POL’Y 1, 18 (2008) (discussing the separate 
legal entity as promoting investment, entrepreneurship, and economic growth, 
without liability attributed to the sovereign or parent company). 
 207.  28 U.S.C. § 1611(b) (1996) (carving special protections for central bank 
property). See Engellenner, supra note 82, at 394 (noting the trend in lower courts 
in exposing central bank assets to attachment end execution). 
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Ultimately, NML Capital continues the trend of U.S. courts 
thrusting American discovery on the world.  Perhaps this is a case of 
misery loving company.  But with many domestic litigants already 
critical of numerous aspects of U.S. discovery,208 the United States 
should be hesitant to impose these rules on parties often unfamiliar 
and ill-equipped to manage them in transnational disputes.  In 
addition to being overly broad, costly, and burdensome, U.S. 
discovery in civil proceedings can expose parties to both criminal 
penalties in their foreign jurisdictions and a heightened risk of 
sensitive and irrelevant information disclosure.  This is particularly 
troubling for sovereign nations where a disclosure of information and 
data could compromise privacy and security interests. 
 D. The Majority Opinion Disregards the Important Roles of 
Comity and Reciprocity, Creating Uncertainty and Tension in 
U.S. International Relations and Diplomacy 
While the majority opinion, penned by Justice Scalia, was quick 
to dismiss the international relations consequences of its decision in 
NML Capital,209 the majority opinion in Aérospatiale, also joined by 
Justice Scalia, noted that: 
[W]e have long recognized the demands of comity in 
suits involving foreign states, either as parties or as 
sovereigns with a coordinate interest in the litigation. 
American courts should therefore take care to 
demonstrate due respect for any special problem 
confronted by the foreign litigant on account of its 
nationality or the location of its operations, and for 
any sovereign interest expressed by a foreign state.210 
While the majority in NML Capital is correct to point out that 
the FSIA is the only factor in determining sovereign immunity, and 
that the common law history is no longer authoritative,211 the doctrine 
of comity has not been erased and still has a place in modern 
transnational disputes. Comity has traditionally been an important 
element of U.S. jurisprudence,212 and it can facilitate stronger 
 
 208.  See John S. Beckerman, Confronting Civil Discovery’s Fatal Flaws, 84 
MINN. L. REV. 505, 50506 (2000) (noting that American discovery remains “the 
most debated, and in some cases the most fractious and vexing, aspect of litigation 
today”). 
 209.  Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2258. 
 210.  Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546. 
 211.  Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2256. 
 212.  Aérospatiale, 482 U.S. at 546; Brewer, supra note 94, at 53435. 
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sovereignty as a flexible, diplomatic solution, rather than a rigid, 
compulsory international framework. 
Indeed, the Supreme Court has actually stated that deference 
should be given to the doctrine of comity.  In F. Hoffmann-La Roche 
Ltd., v. Empagran S.A.,213 the Court noted that it “ordinarily construes 
ambiguous statutes to avoid unreasonable interference with the 
sovereign authority of other nations,” a rule consistent with the 
principles of customary international law.214  In his dissenting opinion 
in Hartford Fire Ins. Co. v. California,215 Justice Scalia advocated the 
use of “prescriptive comity,” a doctrine where courts first assume that 
Congress has taken comity into account when enacting the law, and 
then interpret the law with this assumption in mind.216  Justice Scalia 
further reasoned that “[c]omity in this sense includes . . . principles 
that ‘in the absence of contrary congressional direction,’ are assumed 
to be incorporated into our substantive laws having extraterritorial 
reach.”217 
In fact, the United States Government considers immunity from 
execution under the FSIA as part of a “carefully constructed 
framework [that] preserves comity” in balancing sovereign immunity 
concerns.218  While a U.S. court may render a judgment against a 
foreign state, the FSIA permits immunity from execution and 
attachment of a foreign sovereign’s property, notwithstanding certain 
statutory exceptions.219 This protection is important as “judicial 
seizure of a foreign state’s property may be regarded as a serious 
affront to the state’s sovereignty and affect [the U.S. Government’s] 
relations with it.”220 
While the Supreme Court is not the State Department, it should 
not completely disregard the importance of comity and reciprocity as 
it did in NML Capital.  The United States noted in its amicus brief 
 
 213.  542 U.S. 155 (2004). 
 214.  Id. at 164. 
 215.  509 U.S. 764 (1993). 
 216.  Id. at 817 (Scalia, J., dissenting) (discussing the use of prescriptive comity 
to limit the use of U.S. antitrust law in foreign jurisdictions). 
 217.  Id. (citing Romero v. Int’l Terminal Operating Co., 358 U.S. 354, 38283 
(1959)). 
 218.  Brief for the United States, as Amicus Curiae in Support of Petitioner, 
Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. 2250 (No. 12-842), available at   
http://www.americanbar.org/content/dam/aba/publications/supremecourt_preview/
briefs-v3/12-842_pet_amcu_usa.authcheckdam.pdf. 
 219.  28 U.S.C. § 1610(a) (2012). 
 220.  Brief for the United States, supra note 219, at 9. 
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supporting Argentina that, “‘some foreign states base their sovereign 
immunity decisions on reciprocity.’”221  The Court also recognized 
the importance of reciprocity in Boos v. Barry,222 where it noted that 
respecting the diplomatic immunity of foreign sovereigns will accord 
the United States the same vital treatment.223  The U.S. Supreme 
Court has also recognized the important role international reciprocity 
plays in upholding judgments.  In Hilton v. Guyot,224 the Court found 
that while there was no prejudice, fraud, or lack of due process in the 
French courts, U.S. judgments were not given conclusive effect there, 
so the Court would not give conclusive effect to the French 
judgment.225 
NML Capital opens the door to adverse reciprocal treatment for 
the United States abroad.226  Under reciprocal treatment, a foreign 
court can set itself up as a “clearinghouse” for “information about 
assets and transactions of the U.S. Government throughout the 
world,”227 and need only cite NML Capital for justification. It is also 
worth noting that private litigants, not another sovereign, initiated 
NML Capital.  Consequently, general and broad discovery about the 
U.S. Government’s assets throughout the world could be compelled 
at the instigation of a foreign private litigant. 
The reality is that the rapid and consistent growth of the global 
economy means that, more often than not, U.S. multinational 
corporations will be involved or at least implicated in transactions 
and litigation where foreign legal systems and discovery play an 
important role.228  It would be best to have strong foreign relations 
 
 221.  Id. at 20 (quoting Persinger v. Islamic Republic of Iran, 729 F.2d 835, 841 
(D.C. Cir.), cert denied, 469 U.S. 881 (1984)). 
 222.  485 U.S. 312 (1988). 
 223.  Id. at 323–24. 
 224.  159 U.S. 113 (1895). 
 225.  Id. at 11921.  Although it is an old case, Hilton is still the leading law and 
deserves analysis. See Yuliya Zeynalova, The Law on Recognition and 
Enforcement of Foreign Judgments: Is It Broken and How Do We Fix It?, 31 
BERKLEY J. INT’L L. 150, 155 (2013) (noting that there is no federal law or treaty 
governing the recognition and enforcement of foreign judgments in the United 
States, and that therefore the Erie Doctrine prescribes that state law applies, even in 
federal courts). 
 226.  Brief for the United States, supra note 219, at 20.  See also National City 
Bank of New York v. Republic of China, 348 U.S. 356, 362 (1955) (noting that 
“reciprocal self-interest” is a foundation for foreign sovereign immunity). 
 227.  Brief for the United States, supra note 219, at 21. 
 228.  See Paul Robert Eckert, Utilizing the Doctrine of Adverse Inferences When 
Foreign Illegality Prohibits Discovery: A Proposed Alternative, 37 WM. & MARY 
L. REV. 749, 749 n.1 (1996) (acknowledging that “[w]ith the growth of a modern, 
global economy, commercial business transactions routinely involve multinational 
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and adaptable diplomacy embodied in the doctrines of comity and 
reciprocity, rather than a hostile, forced export of U.S. discovery. 
 E. Sovereign Debt and Discovery Proceedings Are Not “Run-of-
the Mill” 
The Court noted, without deciding, that discovery from nonparty 
banks about the judgment debtor would be permitted in “run-of-the-
mill” execution proceedings.229  The implication is that since 
Argentina did not raise the fact that it is “Argentina,” the Court did 
not have to consider its sovereign status.  Sovereign debtors are not 
typical debtors for the obvious reasons that they are countries, and 
while they have consented to engage in international commerce and 
to accept foreign direct investment, the ramifications of default and 
intrusive discovery must be considered.230 
Sovereign insolvency is nothing new,231 and is certainly not a 
historical anomaly.232  As the Argentine default teaches, the modern 
world and global economy only increase the potential for gain and 
loss.233  Incidents of international financial crisis have increased since 
the 1990s, particularly among emerging-market countries.234 
Sovereign debt is not just a problem for debtor and creditor—it 
is a global issue with far reaching implications.  As the ever-growing 
global market continues to embrace sovereign bonds, so grows the 
risk that one country’s default could “trigger systemic collapse.”235  
While there is a dogmatic belief (mostly espoused by creditors) that 
 
corporations with offices located in and subject to the laws of, a foreign 
jurisdiction.”). 
 229.  Discovery Case, 134 S. Ct. at 2255. 
 230.  See Nate Raymond, Argentina Faces Skeptical U.S. Court Over Creditors’ 
Subpoenas, REUTERS (Dec. 17, 2014, 6:25 PM) http://www.reuters.com/article/201
4/12/17/argentina-debt-appeal-idUSL1N0U136020141217 (noting that the Second 
Circuit acknowledged that Argentina is not an ordinary litigant). 
 231.  See de Jonge, supra note 10, at 129 (noting that Philip II of Spain declared 
a moratorium on the repayment of debts several times during the 1500s). 
 232.  See INT’L MONETARY FUND, SOVEREIGN DEBT RESTRUCTURING—RECENT 
DEV. AND IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUND’S LEGAL AND POLICY FRAMEWORK 1 (Apr. 
26, 2013) available at https://www.imf.org/external/np/pp/eng/2013/042613.pdf 
(noting the sovereign debt restructurings of Greece in February 2012, Belize in 
2007 and 2013, Jamaica in 2010 and 2013, and St. Kitts and Nevis in 2012). 
 233.  See Fernando M. Martin & Christopher J. Waller, Sovereign Debt: A 
Modern Greek Tragedy, 94 FED. RESERVE BANK OF ST. LOUIS REV. 321, 321 
(noting the recent financial crises of Portugal, Ireland, Italy, Greece, and Spain). 
 234.  Andy Haldane & Mark Kruger, The Resolution of International Financial 
Crises: Private Finance and Public Funds, BANK OF CAN. REV., Winter 
20012002, at 4. 
 235.  See de Jonge, supra note 10, at 146. 
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sovereign debt obligations and restructuring should focus on the 
reality of private law (i.e., “a contract is a contract”), this view fails 
to encompass the whole picture because it ignores the distinct 
features that separate sovereign defaults from those in the private 
sector and the important public international law issues at stake.236 
Unlike a private financial crisis, there are no bankruptcy 
proceedings in sovereign defaults, creating a number of unique 
distinctions for debtor-countries.  Creditors have little motivation to 
negotiate timely and moderate deals because there is no threat of 
bankruptcy to contend with.237  Additionally, under the terms of many 
outstanding bonds, minority holdout creditors cannot be forced to 
join a settlement that has been accepted by the majority of creditors, 
something that would occur in bankruptcy proceedings.238  Also, 
sovereign debtors cannot invoke protection against “hostile creditors” 
and are therefore subject to creditor lawsuits.239 
Creditor consensus is another distinguishing feature that creates 
unique problems during sovereign debt restructurings.  If a sovereign 
nation wishes to continue participating in the global financial 
markets, it cannot restructure its debt without the consent and 
participation of its creditors.240  But it is precisely this need for 
consensus that can allow creditors to hold out during debt 
restructuring, as they did in NML Capital. 
The holdout problem has been compounded as sovereign debt 
financing has shifted toward bondholder investing rather than 
traditional bank lending.241 Unlike banks, foreign bondholders and 
speculators have less incentive to build commercial relationships with 
a country.242  Moreover, bondholder investments tend to be smaller 
 
 236.  MICHAEL WAIBEL, SOVEREIGN DEFAULTS BEFORE INTERNATIONAL 
COURTS AND TRIBUNALS 21 (2011). 
 237.  Lee C. Buchheit & G. Mitu Gulati, Responsible Sovereign Lending and 
Borrowing, United Nations Conference on Trade and Development, Discussion 
Paper No. 198, 6 (Apr. 2010). 
 238.  Id. 
 239.  Id. 
 240.  Steven L. Schwarcz,”Idiot’s Guide” to Sovereign Debt Restructuring, 53 
EMORY L.J. 1189, 1192 (2004) [hereinafter “Idiot’s Guide”]. 
 241.  Id. at 1193. 
 242.  Id.  See also Steven L. Schwarcz, Sovereign Debt Restructuring: A 
Bankruptcy Reorganization Approach, 85 CORNELL L. REV. 956, 1004 n.283 
(2000) [hereinafter Restructuring] (utilizing the example of the 1999 Russian debt 
arrears to demonstrate that investors are motivated to accelerate debt, whereas, 
bank lenders “'want future business with Russia’ and therefore ‘may be unwilling 
to pressure the Government on the [debt] arrears’”). 
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than traditional bank loans, leading to a greater number of 
bondholders to negotiate with and increasing the risks of a holdout.243  
As NML Capital teaches, holdout problems create unique litigation 
and repayment issues that are not present in private sector financial 
crises. 
A common remedy offered to combat the holdout problem is the 
inclusion of collective action clauses (CAC) in a bond deal 
agreement.  CACs are private-law solutions that permit changes to 
the agreement’s payment terms through a vote of the creditors.244  But 
CACs are not a straightforward answer.  First, voting thresholds are 
not standardized and can vary significantly—from 19 to 75 percent.245  
Second, there may be procedural requirements attached to CACs (i.e., 
a requirement of a bondholder meeting before a vote) that raise costs 
and may create barriers to negotiations.246  Importantly, CACs do not 
bind creditors across bond agreements meaning creditors may be 
incentivized to vote against restructuring their own agreements in 
case another set of creditors holds out,247 creating a “Prisoners’ 
Dilemma” situation.248  With a large number of creditors, a CAC can 
be rendered impotent. 
There is also concern that broad discovery against a sovereign 
can create risks to national security and undermine the authority of a 
nation as a sovereign.  Holdout creditors are not just seeking 
information regarding Argentine assets, but also information 
regarding Argentine military equipment and diplomatic property.249  It 
does not take much imagination or understanding of foreign 
sovereign immunity or post-judgment execution discovery to realize 
that this is potentially quite problematic. 
 
 243.  Idiot’s Guide, supra note 241, at 1193. 
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 246.  Id. 
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Game Theory, and the Law, 82 S. CAL. L. REV. 209, 21516 (2009) (explaining the 
classic game theory that in the absence of mutually assured cooperation, two 
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 249.  Raymond, supra note 231. 
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V. CONCLUSION 
In Republic of Argentina v. NML Capital, Ltd., the Supreme 
Court permitted post-judgment discovery in-aid-of execution upon a 
sovereign’s extraterritorial assets, though no showing had been made 
that the information sought was reasonably calculated to lead to 
attachable property.250  The Court found that since the subpoenas 
were neither targeted at Argentina nor Argentine property, but rather, 
targeted at non-party banking institutions concerning general 
information about Argentina’s world-wide assets, permitting 
discovery did not violate the FSIA.251  But by refusing to consider the 
relevancy of the discovery requested – as required by the FRCP – the 
Court rendered a ruling that violates a fundamental tenet of U.S. 
discovery law.252  Furthermore, the Court’s disregard of the doctrines 
of comity and reciprocity will jeopardize the U.S. Government’s 
international relations, creating uncertainty and contention.253  
Importantly, the Court’s treatment of the Argentina sovereign debt 
crisis as a “run-of-the-mill” proceeding oversimplifies a complex and 
controversial issue.254 
As it stands, NML Capital contributes to an already problematic 
jurisprudence that fails to provide lower courts a consistent analytical 
model to balance U.S. interests against foreign blocking statutes 
when determining whether to compel transnational discovery.255  But 
NML Capital has gone one step further.  By compelling discovery 
about a sovereign’s extraterritorial assets even though they may be 
immune from execution, the Court has opened an uncertain door that 
neither the FSIA nor Congress intended.256 
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